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Book summary 
Jiajun Xu studies how power transitions affect the outcomes of replenishment conferences at 
the International Development Association (IDA) – a development fund managed by the 
World Bank to assist least developed countries with highly concessional development 
funding. This is a timely analysis given that the multilateral development system is witnessing 
the advent of new institutions. After World War II, the multilateral development system 
reflected the dominant position of the United States – with only a few institutions addressing 
the development needs of least developed countries. During the Cold War, power shifts 
among donor states led to readjustments of voting weights within the existing system. In the 
most recent decade, however, China emerged as a credible challenger to American hegemony, 
attempting to gain influence within the established multilateral institutions while also crafting 
new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New 
Development Bank (NDB).  
Xu identifies three puzzles that the existing literature cannot answer satisfactorily. First, IDA 
contributions do not closely mirror economic capabilities. Which factors other than the 
capacity to pay of a donor thus determines its contribution? Second, the US hegemon further 
increased its policy influence even when its financial contributions decreased. How could the 
hegemon maintain its power despite flagging contributions? And why did ascending powers 
not more rapidly assume bigger shares in IDA funding? Third, US power progressively 
eroded in the past decade, despite only a mild US share cut. Why did burden-shifting occur at 
a greater scale than predicted by underlying economic fundamentals?  
In order to prepare the analytical ground for addressing these questions, the book lays out its 
theoretical foundations that inform the historical analysis of sixteen IDA replenishments in 
subsequent chapters. The key takeaway of the book is that IDA replenishments are complex 
strategic games because donors have preferences over both replenishment size and individual 
burden shares while being driven by fairness concerns. The outcome of replenishment 
negotiations critically depends on geopolitical factors and complex interdependence between 
challenger states and the US hegemon.  
According to Xu, when external threats loom large, the US had an interest to expand IDA in 
order to wield geopolitical influence (as exemplified by the rising Soviet threat in the Cuban 
missile crisis, and the developing-country movement for a New International Economic 
Order). Absent these geopolitical threats, the US preferred a share cut, which would force 
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other states to step up their shares to make good for the shortfall. More often than not, 
challenger states surrendered to US pressure because they were structurally dependent on the 
hegemon (e.g., international trade or military protection). Consequently, US shares in the IDA 
budget dropped – from an initial 40% in 1960 to a mere 11% in 2010 – but without resulting 
in a loss of influence for the US. If the US targeted a smaller IDA contribution for its own, 
then all other donors had to cut their IDA commitments proportionally to maintain their 
burden-shares in line with the IDA charter (even if they wanted a bigger replenishment); 
paradoxically, this rule further amplified US influence despite its own flagging contributions. 
While challenger states were frustrated by the widening contributions-to-influence gap, they 
did not openly challenge US hegemony as long as they depended on US leadership. In 
contrast, China – the most recent challenger – is less dependent on US leadership and 
redressed its lack of influence by becoming an IDA donor and by establishing alternative 
development initiatives outside the World Bank. 
 
Key contributions 
A key strength of the book is that it is easily accessible for the lay reader while also offering 
new insights for scholars of international organizations. In addition, the book has three unique 
selling points: first, it debunks some myths around multilateral replenishments; second, it 
enriches the theoretical debates in International Relations with new evidence from 
international development; more specifically for the literature on the World Bank, it puts 
previous anecdotes about IDA replenishments on a more solid empirical foundation by 
providing a large number of case studies; third, it provides a new theoretical frame for 
understanding the rise of trust funds. I discuss each of these contributions in turn. 
Xu shows that replenishment is not a smooth process but a deeply political process with many 
intervening variables. While the outcome of replenishment is hardly predictable, the book 
identifies some key determinants, notably donor preferences over total size, burden-shares, 
and policy objectives, as well as the political capital invested by the multilateral bureaucracy. 
While economic capabilities predict long-term IDA contribution levels, they are unable to 
predict short-term fluctuations of such contributions. This invalidates a rule-based explanation 
of replenishment outcomes. A donor-interest explanation does not fare well either. Empirical 
evidence from the cases of Germany, Japan, and China does not indicate a clear relationship 
between ascending states assuming greater burden-shares and increasing procurement 
benefits. Xu shows that ‘fairness’ considerations loom large in replenishment negotiations – 
donors are cautious not to cede too much influence to their rivals without commanding 
financial contributions to the collective good. She merits praise for unpacking the concept of 
burden-sharing and drawing attention to the specificities of burden-sharing in development 
finance.  
The book also contributes to the grand debates in International Relations. Its key takeaway is 
that realism can be usefully deployed to understand current developments in multilateral 
politics and the history of IDA replenishments. Going beyond pure neorealism, Xu 
acknowledges state heterogeneity deriving from underlying power differentials and rapid 
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changes in state power. Her book reminds us that the international development system is a 
three-class system in which the traditional donors enjoy all the privileges, developing 
countries are rule-takers, and a group of middle-income countries feel deprived of the 
influence that their economic weight would warrant. With the rise of China, for the first time 
in history a middle-income country that depends less on the US vies for influence. For 
scholars interested in the World Bank, this book is a great source because it is the first to trace 
hegemonic power transitions for all IDA replenishments.   
Perhaps the biggest contribution of this book pertains to the emergent literature on trust funds 
(Sridhar and Woods 2013; Graham 2016; Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017). Xu suggests a 
power-based explanation for trust funds. Challenger states – assuming that they had more 
expansionary preferences than the hegemon – were able to use trust funds only after the Cold 
War when their structural dependence upon the hegemon decreased. In the functionalist view, 
earmarked funding emerges when donor preferences over policy substance and replenishment 
size are divergent (Graham 2016). While both accounts demonstrate the strong connection 
between core resources and non-core resources, Xu considers burden-sharing quotas an 
explicit target and emphasizes donor heterogeneity in terms of power.  
 
Future avenues 
This book leaves only very few wishes unaddressed. Three such wishes entail further 
theorizing on the Chinese engagement in multilateral development institutions, engagement 
with additional branches of literature, and quantitative tests of the proposed theory in light of 
alternative explanations. I discuss each in turn. 
Xu predicts that China should be better able to resist US pressure and pursue independent 
policy agendas because it is not structurally dependent on the US. Her analysis shows that 
China felt excluded from key policy decisions (due to the increased agenda-setting role of 
IDA Deputies versus the Executive Board), while together with other IBRD borrowers being 
forced to finance IDA budgets through IBRD earnings. China therefore decided to step in as 
IDA donor (‘voice’), but the slow pace of reforms also motivated China to finance 
development initiatives outside the World Bank (‘exit’). 
An open question is what factors drive exit-voice decisions of challenger states in response to 
the unrepresentativeness of contemporary international organizations. Recent research has 
started filling this gap. In particular, Kastner, Person, and Rector (2016) show that the 
strategic context of a particular issue of international concern affects the strategic approach of 
ascending powers to redress the apparent lack of influence. Taking the case of China, they 
show that if outside options are relatively poor, China will invest into the existing regime, but 
free-riding ensues if its outside options are valuable and if it is not a necessary player in 
maintaining the regime. Moreover, Güven (2016) analyzes the evolution of World Bank 
lending profiles for seven important middle-income countries, finding that in settings where 
significant operational realignments are possible within existing mandates and governance 
structures, the multipolarity-multilateralism conundrum could be partly mitigated.  
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Global economic governance research is a fast-moving field and therefore it is not surprising 
that the book could not integrate the most recent contributions of the field. This includes the 
emergent literature on trust funds. Xu convincingly explains how donor states distributed the 
financial burden for development funding but misses the opportunity to enlarge the scope of 
her analysis to include earmarked funding outside the burden-sharing mechanism. The book 
could have more explicitly drawn attention to the complex interaction between core resources 
and trust funds mediated by burden-sharing norms.  
While Xu focuses only on formal institutions as outside options, an increasing body of 
literature also notes growing use of informal intergovernmental institutions (Stone 2011; 
Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Westerwinter 2016), particularly by rising powers, and informal 
influence (Dreher et al. 2009; Kilby 2013; Stone 2013). Recent works also emphasize the role 
of power in international politics (Kahler 2015; Kaya 2016). When touching upon the 
domestic politics of multilateral lending, Xu misses out a range of papers showing that 
domestic institutions as well as powerful interests shape policy stances of member states 
(Voeten 2001; Kersting and Kilby 2016). Finally, recent literature has deepened research on 
the concept of burden-sharing and developed statistical tests (Reinsberg et al. 2017). 
The findings from this book are based on meticulous archival work at the World Bank and a 
large number of interviews with staff members and donor representatives. Qualitative 
methods can trace mechanisms of influence, but do not produce generalizable findings and the 
relative importance of competing explanations can only be tested in a quantitative framework. 
A quantitative test of the arguments proposed does not seem out of reach. Variables that are 
relatively easy to measure are economic capabilities, military capabilities, external threats, 
and structural dependence. Other variables are more difficult to measure, but future research 
may start filling these gaps. This book provides a very useful reference point for such 
research. 
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